By Mary van Tamelen

Morning Forum members were treated last Wednesday to a deeply reasoned, densely documented and brilliantly presented analysis of the foreign policy of the Bush administration.

Ken Jowitt, Robson Professor of Political Science at the University of California at Berkeley and Pres and Maurine Hotchkis Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, discussed “American Foreign Policy: Mission Impossible.”

Important decisions are being made right now, Professor Jowitt said, much as they were in 1945 after the second World War. These decisions are based on the “Bush Doctrine,” a recent and radical change for this nation. The doctrine has three elements: military dominance, pre-emptive strikes and political transformation of nondemocratic governments.

The United States has military dominance at this point — enough to dissuade potential adversaries for at least 10 years. Neither the European Union, nor a possible Russian-Chinese alliance, nor a Brazilian-Argentinian combination is likely to go nuclear. The real confrontation emerges with North Korea. They take the Bush doctrine seriously and their fear of a regime change provokes their nuclear development.

As far as pre-emptive strikes are concerned, the U.S. administration maintains an anticipatory strategy. Because there is no way to deter evil leaders, it is necessary to remove them for three reasons: 1) Waiting to deter them would inflict more harm over a longer period; 2) Those leaders are likely to support terrorists; and 3) They are likely to use whatever force they may develop.

The U.S. government feels that a successful regime change would inspire other countries to work toward democratization.

According to the Bush doctrine, some hostile leaders and regimes are impervious to change. Professor Jowitt cited examples of countries which did change such as Russia and China. The question remains, why not wait? Because, Jowitt answered, there are leaders who did not change — such as Hitler and Pol Pot. The challenge is to figure out which is which. Sometimes impatience is good; on the other hand, anticipatory attacks might inspire other nations (such as China and India) to do the same.

Regarding regime change and the push toward democracy, there are two possible approaches, imposition or transition. Under President Clinton, there was a belief, comparable to Marxism, that there would be an automatic transition toward a capitalistic or ideal form of government. Until 9/11, this view prevailed. Now the administration’s view is, comparable to Leninism, that we can’t trust history and we need to help the internal transitions to democracy.

This theory, that the external imposition of democracy is quicker and more effective, is based on the post-World War II results in Japan and Germany. Professor Jowitt illustrated the differences between the present situation in Iraq and that in Japan and Germany — the length of the war, the national culture and their fear of communism.

The Bush view of foreign policy, according to Professor Jowitt, is well reasoned, ingenious and imaginative. The democratic conversion of Iraq could act as a catalyst for Iran to rebel against ayatollah dominance. Then Syria could see the need to liberalize — leading to transformations in Egypt and Jordan. This could convince Saudi Arabia to “appear” to reform. Finally, North Korea would capitulate.

If this country continues this “crusade,” Jowitt explained, it may shortchange the beliefs and cultures of the countries involved. There is no middle class, on which to base market capitalism.; there is only individual capitalism. Neither Syria, Jordan nor Egypt is likely to change, because their governments are based on “authoritarian family” rule.

Although the Coalition invaded Iraq for very good reasons, Jowitt explained that invaded countries are most likely to accept a government like the one they know. For most of the Middle East, that is authoritarian family rule.